Somaliland Vs Djibouti, Article on The Economist (Fr)

The Economist (French) 11/04/2019

Middle East Maelström, Ardavan Amir-Aslani

The Horn of Africa has always been a source of covetousness for all military powers, from the colonial era to the present. France installed its military presence there in 1884. This presence continues to this day. The English, for their part, settled there in 1838. Indeed, the economic importance of this route, which is the Red Sea and its direct access to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean via the Straits separating Djibouti from Yemen, the famous Bab-el-Mandeb, is no longer to be demonstrated. 30 % of the world’s crude oil is transported via this strait, which is thus of real strategic importance.

Today, beyond the strategic importance of this maritime route as regards the transport of hydrocarbons, the stakes of the civil war in Yemen are helping to make the Horn of Africa eminently sensitive. On the other hand, Djibouti has been, and remains, the only stable country in the Horn of Africa with institutions of a rule of law. That is why the country has been retained by a number of powers as the bedrock of their regional presence. In addition to the French base, the United States, Japan, China and Germany have also installed a military presence there which, without the name “base”, has all the characteristics.

The installation of these bases, initially motivated by the fight against piracy, which was a major scourge in the Red Sea in the last decade, finds a new importance with the conflict in Yemen. It was this conflict that prompted the United Arab Emirates to invest in Berbera in Somaliland, USD 442 million in the construction of a deep-water port. This is the largest investment in Somaliland, according to Saed Abdullahi Hassan, the head of the port of Berbera. However, this investment, which is mainly driven by political reasons, is likely to disrupt the regional geopolitical situation. Indeed, Somaliland, which exists within the borders of the former British Somaliland entity, seeks to secede from Somalia and has, on several occasions, proclaimed its independence.

These declarations, however, have only met with mixed success, as no country in the world has agreed to recognise the country’s sovereignty. On the other hand, such an investment will not fail to endorse the claims to the country’s independence and will reduce the prospects for the reunification of Somalia to the chagrin of the international community.
What is particularly unfortunate is that the UAE is seeking through this investment to weaken Somalia, which is close to Qatar. Thus, the Emirati presence in Somaliland is only the continuation of a war of influence between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With the construction of the port of Berbera, however, the UAE will control both sides of the entrance to Bab al-Mandeb. Let us remember that, in advance of this investment decision, the Emirates were in advanced negotiations with Djibouti on the construction of a new port.

Djibouti, formerly a French colony that gained independence in 1977 with a population of just under one million inhabitants, continues to be the recipient of the only American base in Africa, called Cap Lemonnier, and which serves as the headquarters of Africom, a military command created in 2008. The base is also used by the Horn of Africa Combined Task Force to combat extremist organisations in eastern Africa. That base, which under Obama has seen $1.4 billion in investment, is home to 4500 members of the U.S. military. It is from this base that US attack drones target targets in Somalia and Yemen. The Chinese, for their part, built their first overseas base in Djibouti. Even the Saudis have signed an agreement with Djibouti for the installation of a military base.

The interest of so many countries in Djibouti, in relation to Somaliland, at least reflects the stability of that country, a recognized member of the international community. In the end, the choice between Djibouti and Somaliand would be reduced between a recognized country, full member of the Concert of Nations and a Rogue State (“rogue state”).